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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of machine learning in image recognition and natural language 
processing applications comes with increasing risk of adversarial attacks. Such attacks 
can potentially spoof automated detection systems in our drones or defeat facial 
recognition systems and bypass automated security systems. Typical defense techniques 
involve long training times, which would not be viable in an operational setting. The 
thesis utilizes a novel superquantile-based formulation to train machine learning 
systems to make them more robust to noise and adversarial attacks, while incurring less 
training costs compared to typical adversarial training techniques. The concept is 
explored in the context of support vector machines and achieves similar results as in the 
case of L1-regularization models. Subsequently, the concept is developed for neural 
network training with robustness tests on commonly referenced Modified National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (MNIST) and Canadian Institute for Advanced 
Research–10 classes (CIFAR-10) datasets. The test results demonstrate robustness 
against random noise perturbations and benchmark against typical adversarial training 
shows comparable results. This initial excursion into superquantile training sets the 
foundation for further exploration into improving machine learning robustness within less 
computation time. 
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Executive Summary
Artificial intelligence is transforming thewaywework today as it frees us frommundane and
repetitive tasks. Despite the host of benefits that artificial intelligence offers, the process of
building applications using machine learning has its drawbacks and associated risks. Recent
studies have shown that machine learning is prone to adversarial attacks where specially
trained noise patterns can be added to deceive the trained image classifier, and even sensor
noise can also affect accurate detection. In the military context, this can pose security risks
and undermine the performance of unmanned systems that rely on automated detection.
The best known defense currently is adversarial training, but this requires a long training
time due to its min-max formulation.
Our approach is to take an alternate formulation that focus on the higher tail-end losses in the
training data using superquantiles, thereby approximating the worst-case conditions instead
of solving for it explicitly. This effectively replaces the need to solve the maximization
problem in adversarial training with just the expectation of sample points and predefined
perturbations, and thereby faster to compute. The use of superquantiles in machine learning
is not new, but previous efforts focus on general model robustness and have not examined
it in the context of adversarial training.
Adversarial neural network training is difficult to implement in practice because it not only
takes a long computational time, it also has many different hyperparameters to consider
for the iterative solver to converge within reasonable accuracy. In this thesis, we take a
progressive approach that starts from the more manageable support vector machine training
to the more complex neural network training, and build up our choice of training parameters
incrementally. Experimentation with support vector machines allows us to better understand
the regularization effect and robustness characteristics of superquantile training as we vary
the U-superquantile parameter between [0, 1) and different training perturbations. Moving
to neural network training, we use common models (such as residual network model) and
techniques in other adversarial training studies (such as batch normalization) to build a
baseline for robustness benchmarking against typical adversarial training. Commonly used
dataset are chosen for experimentation, namely the breast cancer Wisconsin dataset for
support vector machines, and the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset for neural networks. Since
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robustness concerns both random noise and adversarial attack, the models are evaluated
against random uniform distribution, random Gaussian distribution and projected gradient
descent attacks (commonly regarded as the strongest first-order adversarial attack).
Results show that in the context of support vector machines, superquantile training is able to
match the results of !1-regularization with the appropriate choice of training perturbation
and U = 0.99. Increasing the attack size to 10 allows superquantile training to achieve
2% to 10% better performance, but this comes at the cost of 13 times more computation
time. In the context of neural networks, superquantile training is robust to both random
noise perturbations with minimal difference under different choices of U. Under adversarial
attack, the choice of U = 0.9 brings about significantly better accuracy than U = 0. In
benchmark tests against typical adversarial training, superquantile training takes 35% less




Recent developments in machine learning coupled with the exponential growth in comput-
ing power have led to breakthroughs in computer vision and natural language processing.
Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic systems with autonomous decision making are con-
tinuously being introduced into the military for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) and even strike missions, with some predicting that the next war will be a war
of robots (Khurshid and Bing-Rong 2004, South 2020). Naturally, people get concerned
about the underlying risks and start to demand safety reviews and protection against po-
tential exploits. These concerns were exacerbated by recent demonstrations of adversarial
attacks in real-world applications, where physical items are being modified to spoof current
state-of-the-art automatic detection systems.
Adhikari et al. (2020) demonstrates that automatic object detectors (such as those in drone
surveillance) can be misled when specially designed patches are overlaid on top of military
aircraft images, thereby camouflaging them from automatic detection (shown in Figure 1.1).
The patches in their study are images with size, pattern, position, and color specially trained
against a provided object detector, such that the detector’s classification for the object falls
below a certain confidence threshold. The study has set the threshold sufficiently low such
that the object is perceived as noise by the detector and not highlighted to the operator.
Sharif et al. (2016) demonstrates that it is possible to spoof automated facial recognition
through a specially colored pair of spectacles. The wearer can avoid detection or even
impersonate another individual (shown in Figure 1.2). To avoid detection by the facial
recognition algorithm, the spectacles in their study are designed such that it can minimize
the probability of classification of any single identifiable individual by the facial recognition
algorithm, such that it falls below the detection threshold. Alternatively, their study also
designed spectacles can be used to impersonate other individuals by introducing carefully
selected perturbations such that it crosses the algorithm’s decision threshold for that target
individual. Such methods could potentially enable undercover agents to avoid surveillance
detection or bypass facial recognition security systems, while remaining inconspicuous.
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Figure 1.1. Images of aircraft with pink box overlays to indicate positive
detection by detection algorithm. (a) Patches of random noise are overlaid
on each aircraft image and shown to be generally unsuccessful at defeating
the object detection algorithm. (b) Same aircraft but with adversarial patches
causing no positive identification, thereby defeating the detection algorithm.
Source: Adhikari et al. (2020).
Figure 1.2. Impersonators wearing specially printed glasses at the top row
with their corresponding mismatched persona by the facial recognition algo-
rithm at the bottom row. Source: Sharif et al. (2016).
These are examples of adversarial attacks that can threaten the stability and safety of AI
systems (Szegedy et al. 2014). The attacks can take various forms and create avenues for
many types of deception to corrupting the system operator’s situational awareness, leading
to surprises and less predictable military engagements. This can lead to situations where the
operator face more difficulty with the AI system than without, thereby degrading operator
effectiveness and nullifying the advantage brought about by the AI system.
However, adversarial attacks assume that the attacker has prior knowledge of the model and
data used, and has the time and resources to prepare and deploy their attacks beforehand.
This is difficult to accomplish in practice since the required information are usually tightly
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guarded (more so in themilitary context) and themodel will likely undergo constant changes
and updates. Therefore, it is also important to evaluate the more likely scenario where an
adversary does not have prior knowledge of the data model and only able to use some simple
obfuscation methods, such as random noise.
AI systems are also susceptible to common disturbances, such as rain, dust storms, snow,
and even small defects on the image sensor. Dodge and Karam (2016) show that state-of-
the-art models are susceptible to image compression, particularly to blur and noise. It is
arguably more important to address the accuracy degradation from these random events
and perturbations since they are more likely to occur. To address this issue, recent works
have demonstrated improved robustness by using random noise in the machine learning
process. Cohen et al. (2019) suggest augmenting training images with Gaussian noise to
give a regularization effect for smoothing the decision boundary and shows that it can be
a good theoretical and empirical defense. Rusak et al. (2020) demonstrate Gaussian noise
augmented training can generalize well to different forms of perturbations, while regular
adversarial training can not. It is therefore important to consider incorporating common
random noise perturbations into the machine learning process to harness its regularization
properties and gain robustness.
To cater for this wide spectrum of attacks from strong adversarial to weak random noise, we
tackle the underlying formulation in the robustness problem and develop a tunable statistical
training approach based on superquantile optimization.
1.1 Background
AI systems are under increasing scrutiny in recent years as their vulnerabilities are being
discovered, thereby increasing the risk of exploitation and undermining the safety of their
users. There are numerous recent studies that seek to better understand these vulnerabilities
and propose building certain robustness guarantees into AI systems. Some of these research
have advanced our understanding of robustness in neural network training and provide a
basic arsenal of tools to improve model robustness. Before diving into these recent studies
on neural network robustness, we first describe neural networks and how it is used for image
recognition.
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1.1.1 Neural Networks for Classification
A neural network is fundamentally a set of nodes placed in different layers with connections
drawn between the nodes called edges. The artificial feed-forward neural network is com-
monly used in image processing applications, as shown in Figure 1.3, where the objective
is to pass signals through the network from the input layer to the output layer to reach
a certain prediction of the outcome (e.g. 70% likelihood of class A and 30% likelihood
of class B). Each of the nodes and edges can carry a weight, while each node also has a
predetermined threshold, and the signal can only be passed out from the node to the next
layer if the aggregate signal at the node is above the specified threshold. Once all signals
reach the output layer, the aggregated strength of the signals will determine the final answer
returned by the neural network. To find the appropriate weights for the nodes and edges,
training data with known inputs and outputs is used to tune those values until the network
is able to correctly answer most of the training problems.
Figure 1.3. Simple neural network example using 5 layers to process input
data G1, G2, G3 into output signal ~1, ~2.
The process of training the neural network, or learning, can be carried out by the empirical
risk minimization (ERM) formulation first proposed in Vapnik (1992) which takes a statis-
tical approach to solve the learning problem. The learning process consists of 3 important
components, namely, (1) the input vector G with distribution %(G), (2) the supervisor with
output vector ~ with conditional distribution %(G |~), and (3) the learning machine that im-
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plements a prediction function i(G, |) where | are the weights in the neural network that
can be varied to give the best approximate response. The discrepancy between the response
~ and the prediction function i(G, |) is qualified by the loss function ℓ(~, i(G, |)), which
is aggregated with the conditional distribution to give the risk functional of the form:
'(|) =
∫
ℓ(~, i(G, |))3%(G, ~). (1.1)
However, the real-world joint probability distribution %(G, ~) = %(~ |G)%(G) is unknown, so
one turns to the empirical risk functional




ℓ(~8, i(G8, |)), (1.2)
where the training set {G8, ~8}#8=1 is used in lieu of the true total population distribution, and
ERM assumes that the weights |∗ that minimizes  (|) will also result in a risk '(|∗)
close to the true minimum '(|). This is an important assumption since this is linked to
the algorithm’s vulnerability to discern previously unseen perturbations in the training set.
Adversaries can also exploit this by instigating noise distribution shifts to their favor and
cause the algorithm to misclassify completely.
1.1.2 Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks
The aforementioned examples of deception are carried out on deep learning image classifiers
through a technique termed adversarial attack. Szegedy et al. (2014) first discovered that
neural networks with high accuracy are prone to misclassification when certain impercepti-
ble perturbations are applied. Such perturbations can be found by maximizing the network’s
prediction error, and the resulting images are termed adversarial examples. This research
sparked the interest to create increasingly sophisticated adversarial attacks, and Goodfellow
et al. (2015) soon followed with the introduction of the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
method that could work effectively within a small perturbation budget of Y by using the
gradient of the loss function ℓ to create adversarial images of the form
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G03{ = G + Y{, (1.3)
where { is a vector determined by the sign of the gradient of ℓ(~8, i(G8, |)) with respect to
G as evaluated at each data point G8.
This gradient-based method is enhanced in Kurakin et al. (2016) that proposes the Basic
Iterative Method, which applies the fast method multiple times with a smaller step size.
This family of iterative norm-bounded perturbations is termed as projected gradient descent
(PGD) and commonly regarded as the strongest first-order attack.
1.1.3 Defense against Adversarial Attacks
The demonstration of neural network vulnerability to adversarial examples has spurned
numerous methods to improve its robustness, such as defensive distillation (Papernot et al.
2016; Carlini and Wagner 2017a), feature squeezing (Xu et al. 2018; He et al. 2017), and
evaluation of several other adversarial detection approaches (Carlini and Wagner 2017b).
These aforementioned methods give a good cursory exploration of the solution space, but
they do not offer a good understanding for guaranteed protection, and only work empirically
against specific attacks. This makes it difficult to evaluate the associated security risks and
implications, thereby hindering its adoption in military applications.
Madry et al. (2017) shows that one can adopt the robust optimization approach to achieve








ℓ(~, i(G + b, |))
]
, (1.4)
where the min-max formulation casts both the attack and defense in a common framework,
and runs an inner optimization procedure to find the worst-case adversarial examples during
training before adding them in some sense to the training data. This is termed adversarial
training and often regarded as the most successful method for training robust deep neural
networks.
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Typical adversarial training will include some form of adversarial attack to approximate
the inner maximization term, followed by gradient descent on the model to solve for the
parameters |. Madry et al. (2017) shows that the PGD adversary makes a good approximate
in this training, and multiple random restarts typically improve the approximation of the
inner maximization.
Various refinements of the adversarial training method produce better convergence and
robustness, such as Dong et al. (2018) for incorporating momentum in the attack procedure
and Xie et al. (2019) for incorporating feature denoising in the network architecture. More
notable methods include TRADES proposed in Zhang et al. (2019) to trade adversarial
robustness against accuracy, and MART proposed in Wang et al. (2020) which explicitly
differentiates the misclassified and correctly classified examples during training. However,
Rice et al. (2020) shows that the performance gains from the aforementioned algorithmic
improvements can be matched by early stopping and there are still aspects the research
community does not yet understand about adversarial training.
Despite the continuous development of adversarial training algorithms, the min-max prob-
lem formulation is difficult to solve and may require extensive computational resources and
training time. This is because (a) the min-max problem is essentially nonsmooth and can
potentially cause standard algorithms to slow down, and (b) subgradient calculations require
solving a nonconcave and constrained maximization problem to determine the present worst
case attack, which is computationally costly to achieve even approximately. In the military
context, this time penalty translates to longer lead time to retrain and recover AI systems
after detecting the adversarial attacks, thereby hindering the operation of some time critical
functions such as target identification in unmanned ISR and facial recognition in security
screening.
1.1.4 Risk Considerations in Statistical Training
Instead of minimizing the mean loss as in ERM, one can focus more on the higher tail-
end losses and minimize the worst-case losses. Rockafellar and Royset (2010) provides
an analysis of this alternative approach through the use of superquantiles. Generally, the
U-superquantile of a random variable is defined as the average value of the outcomes beyond
the U-quantile. This concept can be traced back to Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000), where
7
it is also called conditional value at risk (CVaR), and is commonly used in finance.
The application of superquantile in the context of machine learning is not new. Sani et al.
(2013) uses superquantiles to measure regret in risk-averse decision making under a mul-
tiarmed bandit setting to identify the arm which best trades off risk and returns; Chow
et al. (2015) proposes using superquantiles as a measure of risk in risk-constrained Markov
decision processes for efficient reinforcement learning; and Williamson and Menon (2019)
uses the superquantile concept to formulate a novel risk measure for evaluating fairness. In
the field of classification robustness, Laguel et al. (2020) proposes the use of a smoothed
superquantile function to achieve more robust behavior, but it works only with a customized
optimization toolbox for superquantile-based learning that is difficult to implement for neu-
ral network training. Soma and Yoshida (2020) proposes a risk-averse statistical learning
framework that uses the superquantile approach to evaluate losses and compares its accuracy
with typical learning techniques using stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Curi et al. (2020)
proposes an adaptive sampling algorithm for evaluating the superquantile-based loss dis-
tribution and has demonstrated higher robustness using common SGD based optimization.
However, none of the recent papers have examined robustness in the adversarial context and
mostly limited to perturbations inherent in the dataset.
1.2 Study Objective
In this thesis, we propose an alternative approach to the min-max problem in adversarial
training Equation (2.1) and make use of smooth approximations to take advantage of the
associated speed-up, while implicitly identifying the approximately worst attacks instead
of solving for the worst attack via a maximization problem. This approach relies on ap-
proximating the worst-case loss by the superquantile loss. The maximization portion in
adversarial training is replaced by an expectation of artificially generated sample points and
predefined perturbations. Moreover, this approach makes the adversarial problem lookmore
like ERM where any version of SGD could be applied, but at the cost of some additional
parameters and uncertainties.
In view of the challenges in building robust machine learning applications under an opera-
tional setting (susceptible to both deliberate attacks and random noise), this thesis aims to
apply the superquantile approach to train robust neural network models under the following
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scenarios - (1) worst case adversarial attack, and (2) random noise attacks, while requiring
less time and computing resources compared to typical adversarial training.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The subsequent sections of this thesis formulate and apply the idea of superquantiles in
training support vector machine (SVM) and convolutional neural network (CNN) models
to generate robust solutions for various real datasets. Chapter II presents the mathematical
formulation and experimentation approach used in this thesis. Chapter III examines the
application of superquantile SVMmodel to a real-world cancer testing dataset and compares
the accuracy and robustness performance against !1-regularization. Chapter IV focuses on
the testing of superquantile CNN on real-world Modified National Institute of Standards
and Technology (MNIST) and Canadian Institute For Advanced Research - 10 classes
(CIFAR-10) database and compares the performance with common adversarial training
techniques. Chapter V concludes the thesis and highlights possible areas for future research.
9




Adversarial training has been proven as themost effectivemethod of training neural networks
to be robust to random noise and deliberate adversarial attacks.We can formulate adversarial









ℓ(~8, i(G8 + b8, |)), (2.1)
where {G8, ~8}#8=1 is the training dataset of size # , with G denoting the input vector and ~
being the desired output vector of a prediction model i, which has model parameters | (e.g.
weights in the neural network). Ξ is the perturbation set containing the perturbation vectors
b8
#
8=1 that targets the input vector G. The inner maximization serves to find the worst-case
samples, while the outer minimization serves to train the expected loss to give the best
possible robust prediction model.
There are various forms of the loss functions ℓ to quantify how well the model is able to
approximate the given data, such as the Squared Error loss function and the commonly used
Cross Entropy loss function. In regression problems, the Squared Error loss, also called !2-
loss, is simply the square of the difference between the true value ~ and the corresponding
predicted value I:
ℓB4 (~, I) = (~ − I)2. (2.2)
In multi-class classification problems with number of classes with one-hot encoded labels
(e.g. [ 0 0 0 1 . . . 0]), the categorical Cross Entropy loss is the log product between
the actual class label ~ 9 and the corresponding predicted probability I 9 :
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ℓ24 (~, I) = −
∑
9=1
~ 9 log(I 9 ). (2.3)
This effectively predicts the probability of the given datum belonging to the target class,
similar to maximum log-likelihood estimation, where the objective is to maximize the
likelihood of the predicted distribution in matching the ground truth.
The min-max problem is difficult to solve in practice. We propose to use superquantiles
to approximate the worst case condition and use its smooth approximation and convexity
properties to speed up the solution process.
2.1 Superquantile Approximations
For U ∈ [0, 1) and a random variable {, the U-superquantile is defined as
&̄U = &U +
1
1 − UE [max{0, { −&U}] , (2.4)
where &U is the U-quantile of { (Royset and Wets 2021, Section 3.C). This means that the
superquantile &̄U represents the average of the outcomes above the quantile &U as shown
in Figure 2.1.
The special case &̄0 = E[{] shows that the superquantiles includes expectations, and
conversely, we define &̄1 as the limit of &̄U for U→ 1. By Royset and Wets (2021), Section
3.C, this implies that &̄1 equals the largest possible value of {.




ℓ (~8, i(G8 + b8, |)) (2.5)
as equivalent to the U = 1 superquantile of the loss ℓ (~8, i(G8 + b8, |)), where we treat the
loss function as the random variable {. We think of b8 as a component of the loss function
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Figure 2.1. Probability density function for a continuous random variable {
with the quantile &U marked out and superquantile &̄U as the mean of { in
the upper U-quantile.
and a random vector with a distribution supported on Ξ. Moreover, this superquantile can
be approximated by &̄U of the random variable for U < 1.






1 − UE [max {0, { − W}]
}
, (2.6)
through the auxiliary variable W for any random variable {.























which is an approximation of (2.1). Here, the expectation is taken with respect to the random
variable b8, which is assumed to have support Ξ. In particular, as U→ 1, this approximation
becomes more accurate. This is a convex problem if ℓ(~, i(G, |)) is convex in |.
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After approximating the inner expectation using stochastic sampling, we achieve an approx-























where b8 9 , 8 = 1, . . . , # , 9 = 1, . . . , " are samples from any distribution on Ξ.
This formulation is easier to solve computationally as it avoids the difficult inner maximiza-
tion term in adversarial training that typically requires additional iterative steps to find the
subgradients of the model | and the corresponding worst case perturbation to the model.
Instead, it is approximated with a simple-to-compute maximization operation with a choice
of U that is close to 1. It is also more computationally efficient for the solver to find the
corresponding W in the convex superquantile formulation since it should typically take less
dimensions than the model weights | in the nonconvex neural network models. Therefore,
we should expect to see faster convergence rate in a convex setting.
However, this still leaves behind a minor issue of a maximization term in (2.8). We can
easily overcome this by designing some smoothness into the objective function to facilitate










However, the exponential term can result in overflow during the training process, so an
alternative formulation is used:








Substituting (2.10) into the superquantile form in (2.8) gives the final smoothed version
























This proposed reformulation resembles ERM, but with a different criterion function with
additional uncertainties and parameters. This criterion function serves to preserve the con-
vexity and smoothness properties in |, even locally, thereby providing a faster rate of con-
vergence where applicable. The number of additional parameters is usually much smaller
than the dimension of the neural network model.
The U-superquantile parameter serves to adjust the level of robustness by penalizing larger
and unlikely attacks, instead of just looking at reducing the mean number of mistakes. This
can help to address the issue of classifiers performing well on average, but occasionally
failing outright. This is equivalent to adding a regularization effect in the training process
and thereby drawing a more robust decision boundary. In this thesis, we consider different
U values from 0 to near 1 when testing on real-world data, which can have nonlinear
relationships and difficult to solve.
This formulation is also designed with the purpose of maintaining compatibility with all
versions of gradient-based methods in mind. This will allow us to leverage any future
developments in this direction since the use of gradient methods, such as SGD, is very
popular in the machine learning community.
2.2 Experimentation Approach
Since there are limited references available for the use of superquantiles in neural networks
and almost none in its application in adversarial training, we decided to adopt a more
progressive approach starting with the well-established SVM method. This is a simple and
useful check to verify that the superquantile formulation does tend to be more robust as U
increases and the loss function is truncated to theworst case upper tail-end of the distribution.
We can also easily benchmark superquantile performance against !1-regularization as
reference. Moreover, SVM is relatively quick to run on most modern machines, so we
can conduct more parametric studies on the different parameters (such as the type of
perturbation, size of training perturbation and amount of regularization).
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Subsequently, we switch to the main focus — neural network training where both random
noise and adversarial noise perturbations are used. In neural network training, we use SGD
to optimize the model weights | and the auxiliary variable W. SGD belongs to a class of
algorithms called Gradient Descent which are iterative algorithms that typically start from
a random point on a function and travel in the direction of steepest descent in small steps
until it reaches the minima. The step size taken per iteration is determined by the learning
rate, which needs to be small enough to avoid missing minima, while large enough to ensure
practical convergence speed; see Royset and Wets (2021), Section 3.G.
For large datasets, it becomes difficult to compute the gradient for all data points and SGD
circumvents this issue by randomly choosing one data point at each iteration to reduce the
computations required. However, this can be slow to converge, so it becomes common to
sample more datapoints called mini-batch to improve the accuracy estimate of the error
gradient. In addition, SGD and mini-batches are set such that each datapoint in the training
dataset will be passed exactly once in an iteration cycle, called epoch.
It is clear that the SGD method has more hyperparameters to consider than SVM. This
include the training and testing batch size, step size per iteration, and total number of
iterations. The choice of model is also important since too deep a network could result in
"memory leak" where information from the input is lost and the network does not learn
anything. All these involve more testing and troubleshooting on the setup before we can
obtain quality results.
Lastly, we benchmark the superquantile methods robustness performance against typical
adversarial training using commonly usedMNIST andCIFAR-10 datasets. Since the training
process will take much longer to run, the number of parametric runs are limited and we will
target only those of strong interest, namely, model accuracy changes with U and amount of
perturbation.
Using these benchmark tests, we can then infer the performance gains and trade-offs with




SVM is a commonly used machine learning method for classification, regression and outlier
detection. The objective of the SVM algorithm is to find a hyperplane that can effectively
divide the known dataset into their respective classes, which is effectively a minimization
problem to have as few misclassified points as possible. We are interested in SVM because
it also shares similarities with adversarial training. It also has an inner maximization com-
ponent that seeks the largest margin between the data points and the decision boundary for
more robust prediction. We can reformulate the objective into a superquantile form and ex-
periment with real-world data to get a better understanding of its robustness characteristics,
specifically its response to changes in U quantile and training noise.
3.1 SVM Formulation and Algorithm
We apply the SVMmethod in a similar setting to ERM in (1.2) but with a predicted category
I = 0>G + 1, and the goal is to estimate the corresponding parameters 0, 1 that minimizes







ℓ(~8, 0>G8 + 1), (3.1)








max{0, 1 − ~8 (0>G8 + 1)}. (3.2)
To find a solution that is robust to uncertainty or perturbations to the G dataset, Lanckriet
et al. (2002) proposes introducing an additional perturbation variable b ∈ Ξ and modifying












max{0, 1 − ~8 (0>(G8 + b8) + 1)}
}
. (3.3)








max{0, 1 − ~8 (0>G8 + 1)} + d‖0‖1. (3.4)
The min-max formulation is difficult to solve computationally, and this usually requires
nonlinear programming that is slow to compute. Instead, we see that it is possible to
reformulate it into a linear objective function by introducing additional variables I1, . . . , I#













1 − ~8 (0ᵀG8 + 1) ≤ I8,∀8
D: ≤ 0: ,∀:
D: ≥ −0: ,∀:,
(3.5)
where D is an auxiliary variable for finding the regularization term that can minimize
misclassification. There are better ways for solving the SVM robustness problem, such as
expressing the uncertainty in intervals (ElGhaoui et al. 2003), having adjustable hyperplanes
that accommodate real-world datasets (Le et al. 2014) and using the Difference-of-Convex
for efficient computations (Zhang et al. 2018). Nonetheless, the formulation in (3.5) will
suffice for our purpose here.
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With this formulation, we can solve a multi-class classification problemwith the appropriate
choice of linear optimization solver for any labeled dataset. We split the dataset between
training and testing, and inject perturbations to each so that we can test the accuracy of the
model in predicting unseen and artificially perturbed test data. To test the robustness of the
approach, the amount and type of perturbation b added to the test data are varied up to a
bound of Y and repeated over multiple iterations to achieve greater statistical confidence.
We outline the algorithm to solve the SVM !1-regularization problem in Algorithm 1.
Firstly, the dataset is split into training and test sets, and normalized according to their
population mean and standard deviation. Subsequently, we specify the parameter values
for d and Y to set the amount of perturbation to use for testing and initialize the variables
{0, 1, D} to 0 for the solver. After solving for the first set of {0, 1, D} using the formulation
stated in (3.5), we calculate the prediction accuracy of the model against the previously
unseen and perturbed test data. This solving process is repeated multiple times to assess
how well the model performed on average against random perturbations.
Algorithm 1 Calculate the accuracy of SVM using !1-regularization with a perturbation
profile Ξ bounded by d
Select !1 penalty term d ≥ 0 and error budget Y ≥ 0.
Parse the dataset and split 80:20 into training and test sets and project onto [0,1] range.
Normalize the training and test sets.
Initialize the variables {0, 1, D} to 0.
for = ∈ num of iterations do
Solve the SVM optimization problem for variables 0 and 1 in (3.5)
Inject perturbations to the test data: G? = G + Yb, while clipping G? ∈ [0, 1]
Calculate the accuracy of the model 3 = 1 − ℓ(~, 0ᵀ (G?) + 1) .
end for
Calculate the mean accuracy 3̄ = 3/=.
For the superquantile formulation, the objective function (2.8) can be reformulated with
the introduction of an additional parameter I to replace the inner max term. The prediction
function i(G, |) is assumed to be affine and takes the form i(G, |) = 0>G + 1 with weights
| = (0, 1). In contrast to the !1-regularization problem in (3.4), the regularization term
d is not used and perturbations are added to the training dataset. Additional unknowns to
be considered in the problem include the superquantile parameter U and auxiliary variable
W. The choice of U close to 1 should control the loss calculation in a more conservative
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manner similar to the use of a regularization term, while the W variable will be solved to
give the U-quantile for the given U specified. The SVM objective function with the use of













I8, 9 ≥ 0,∀8, 9
1 − ~8
(
0>(G8 + b 9 ) + 1
)
≤ I8, 9 + W8,∀8, 9
0 ≤ I8, 9 + W8,∀8, 9 .
(3.6)
We outline the algorithm used to examine the accuracy of the superquantile SVM method
in Algorithm 2, which is largely similar to the algorithm for !1-regularization except for
the additional steps taken to account for the extra optimization variable W and superquantile
parameter U. In addition, we adjust the perturbed data to ensure that they do not exceed the
allowable range [0, 1] through clipping, which makes values greater than 1 become 1, and
values below 0 become 0.
3.2 Experiment Setup
To test the robustness of the model with noise training, 2 types of random noise were added
to the training and test data, namely, uniform and Gaussian noise. The amount of noise
added is controlled by the noise budget X and Y for training and test data respectively. In
the case of uniform noise, the budget refers to the lower and upper bounds, while Gaussian
noise uses this as the standard deviation.
There are many variables in the model, so we approach the problem progressively by first
establishing a good baseline for comparison, before testing the effects of the superquantile
variables. The criteria for the baseline include good model accuracy, reasonable robustness
within a wide error budget range, and ability to demonstrate monotonic behaviour.
Each scenario is iterated more than 50 times using different independently generated sample
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Algorithm 2 Calculate the accuracy of SVM using superquantile approach with a pertur-
bation profile Ξ
Select U ∈ [0, 1), error budget Y ≥ 0 and attack size " .
Parse the dataset and split 80:20 into training and test sets and project onto [0,1] range.
Normalize the training and test sets.
Initialize the variables 0, 1, W to 0.
for = ∈ num of iterations do
Enlarge the vector space of G by duplicating it " times.
Inject perturbations into the training dataset:
GC = G + Xb, and clip GC ∈ [0, 1]
Solve the SVM optimization problem for parameters 0 and 1 in (3.6)
Inject perturbations to the test data:
G? = G + Yb, and clip G? ∈ [0, 1]
Calculate the accuracy of the model 3 = 1 − ℓ(~, 0>G? + 1).
end for
Calculate the mean accuracy 3̄ = 3/=.
noise for training and testing, and the average test accuracy is used for comparison. A
sufficiently large number of iterations is necessary to clearly reflect the statistical difference
between the results.
3.2.1 Breast Cancer Wisconsin Dataset
We use the dataset from Dua and Graff (2017) since it is commonly used for SVM testing.
The data is collected from 569 digitized images and includes 32 attributes (all numeric) that
describe the characteristics of the cell nuclei. The classification objective is to identify if
the sample is "benign" or "malignant". This dataset is fast to run on any modern computer
and has a known issue of overfitting to the training set without regularization. Therefore,
we test it against the !1-regularization and superquantile approach to compare their model
accuracy under perturbations as a measure of their relative regularization strength.
3.2.2 Computation Resource Used
All computations in this chapter are performed on a local machine with a 3.6 GHz Intel
i5-8600K processor, 16GB RAM and a 8GB NVIDIA Geforce 1070 Ti graphics processor.
All statistical computations and data manipulation are performed using Python, while
optimization is performed using CBC solver by Computational Infrastructure for Operations
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Research (COIN-OR) and packaged using Pyomo. The solver typically took less than 5 min
to reach a solution, while each test took less than 1 min to complete 50 iterations.
3.3 !1-Regularization Results
Multiple tests are conducted over a range of !1-regularization quantities (from 0 to 0.2)
across an error budget Y (from 0 to 1) to find the optimal penalty value d that can produce
the most robust result. As expected, the model accuracy is generally lower without !1-
regularization due to some overlap in the data clusters.
After testing under both uniform and Gaussian noise types, the results in Figures 3.1 and
3.2 show that d = 0.02 works best for the cancer dataset in both tests with the highest model
accuracy of 96% under 0 noise. Interestingly, the regularization values in the range from
0.01 to 0.04 all produced fairly similar results, indicating that this particular dataset only
requires a small amount of noise training to be robust. However, the benefit of regularization
quickly breaks down once d = 0.1, where the accuracy under 0 noise takes a significant
reduction to 85-86%, and this degrades further until it becomes seemingly agnostic to noise
at d = 0.2.

























Figure 3.1. Model accuracy results with different !1-regularization values
and uniform noise perturbations
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Figure 3.2. Model accuracy results with different !1-regularization values
and Gaussian noise perturbations.
Comparing the results between uniform and Gaussian noise shows that both results are
largely similar with the same characteristics, but Gaussian produces a slightly stronger
attack at higher error budgets. This is not unexpected since the Gaussian distribution is not
bounded and able to produce higher perturbation than uniform at the tail-end.
3.4 Superquantile Results
3.4.1 Training Noise
There is a difference in the formulation between !1-regularization and superquantiles, which
will result in slightly different responses to the amount of noise added in the training data.
!1-regularization uses d‖0‖1 as a standalone regularization term, while the superquantile
keeps the training noise term within the prediction function 0>G + 1 and we vary the noise
amount by X such that b = X{* [0, 1], # [0, 1]}. Therefore, some difference is to be expected
when we test with the same set of X and d values.
Looking at the results in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we notice that the training budget X = 0.2
performed better than the rest in terms of accuracy throughout the noise range. This implies
23
that the regularization effect using superquantiles is about 10 times weaker compared to
!1-regularization. This also caused a more gradual increase in accuracy with each increase
in training noise. This implies that it may not be easy to search for the optimal amount of
noise to achieve the most optimal amount of robustness. However, there is some assurance
that this is monotonic, so one should continue to try increasing the amount of training noise
until a satisfactory level of robustness has been obtained.






















Figure 3.3. Superquantile model accuracy results with different training noise
X and uniform noise perturbation.






















Figure 3.4. Superquantile model accuracy results with different training noise
X and Gaussian noise perturbation.
24
Comparing the results between uniform and Gaussian noise, we observe that both trends
are largely similar, with Gaussian showing slightly steeper degradation with increasing
Y. This was also noted in the !1-regularization case, indicating that this dataset is more
sensitive to Gaussian noise. Therefore, we choose X = 0.2 and Gaussian noise as the basis
for comparison.
3.4.2 Superquantile Parameter U
Since U in the superquantile formulation controls the level of conservative loss with U = 1
being the most risk-adverse with consideration for the worst possible examples, it should
behave similar to a regularization term that develops robust models with controlled conser-
vatism. However, testing with different U values with Gaussian noise perturbation shows no
clear difference as shown in Figure 3.5. Nonetheless, the results match closely with the best
!1-regularization performance at d = 0.02.

























Figure 3.5. Minimal effect on the superquantile model accuracy with different
U parameter at X = 0.2; similar robustness compared to !1-regularization
with optimal d = 0.02.
We explore the effect of increasing the attack size " in training from 1 to 10, since it
can help to introduce more variability in the training space. This manages to create more
differentiation between the different U results shown in Figure 3.6. Interestingly, this also
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increases the robustness of the results to test perturbations. U = 0.9 has more accuracy
compared to !1-regularization in the range Y = (0.1, 0.5). However, the increase in attack
size also causes a slight degradation in absolute model accuracy when Y = 0 and U = 0,
possibly due to an amplification of inherent data bias. The solver also has to deal with 10
times more training data, resulting in a significant increase in solving time (from 0.6 to 8.8
seconds). Nonetheless, we take this observation of combining high U and increasing attack
size " into consideration for subsequent neural network analysis in Chapter 4 to achieve
more robust results.

























Figure 3.6. Some differentiation on model accuracy with attack size 10
and different U parameter at X = 0.2; higher robustness compared to !1-
regularization near Y = 0.2.
Using uniformly distributed randomnoise shows amoremonotonic behaviorwith increasing
U as shown in Figure 3.7. The increase in U produces a more pronounced improvement
in model accuracy throughout the Y range compared to the Gaussian noise profile used
in Figure 3.6. The improvement also appears to be more uniform throughout the error
range, suggesting that the superquantile model responds more linearly to uniform random
noise perturbations. However, many of the superquantile results are performing worse than
!1-regularization, prompting us to try higher X training noise.
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Figure 3.7. Greater differentiation on model accuracy with uniform distri-
bution whilst keeping attack size 10 and different U parameter at X = 0.2;
higher robustness than !1-regularization only at certain conditions.
3.4.3 Higher Training Noise (X = 0.4)
Testing a large X = 0.4 training noise with attack size 10 surprisingly shows significantly
better robustness than !1-regularization throughout the test error range, as shown in Figure
3.8. This suggests that the superquantile formulation can offer a stronger regularization effect
than typical !1-regularization with more training noise. However, the high U = 0.99 results
in a reduction in model accuracy, similar to the effect of using a high !1-regularization
term in Figure 3.1. This suggests that the superquantile formulation can result in a strong
regularization effect when U −→ 1 and the optimal level of regularization may be an U value
somewhere in the range [0,1), which will require some experimentation to ascertain its
performance.
Despite the reduction in model accuracy for U = 0.99 for Y = 0, its accuracy in the
upper error Y is the highest. Moreover, its accuracy appears flat at about 0.9 in the lower
Y error range, making its performance more predictable when dealing with random noise
perturbations. Therefore, there could be some benefits for choosing U = 0.99, especially if
we have prior knowledge that the noise perturbation is going to be high.
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Figure 3.8. Increasing training perturbation to X = 0.4 at attack size 10 is
able to produce greater robustness for certain U, but not in the lower Y range




The use of neural networks is prevalent in AI applications, and adversarial training is
the most commonly accepted method to improve neural network robustness. However, this
involves high computational costs and long training time, so we propose to apply the concept
of superquantiles to approximate the adversarial process of finding worst case examples,
with the aim of achieving a robust solution within a shorter training time. We first test
the method on the more manageable MNIST dataset to ensure that our implementation
of superquantiles is accurate and obtain stable SGD optimization hyperparameters, before
experimenting with the more computationally expensive CIFAR-10 dataset.
4.1 Neural Network Training Algorithm
Various hyperparameters need to be predefined for stable and consistent learning (including
learning rate, batch size, and total training epochs), in addition to the parameters for training
perturbations that also require testing. To facilitate code development and troubleshooting,
we take reference to the code and hyperparameters used by Wu et al. (2020) for achieving
state-of-the-art robustness to CIFAR-10 dataset, and modify it to incorporate superquantile
losses. For the MNIST dataset, we have to re-calibrate some of the parameters (such as
the dimensions of the neural network model and learning rate) to suit the different data
dimensions.
Our algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 3 and is similar to typical adversarial training
where perturbations are injected into the training dataset and the final trained model is
evaluated against previously unseen test data with different levels of perturbation. It starts
with the initial selection of superquantile, training perturbation and neural network training
hyperparameters by the user and parses in the respective training and test dataset. Some
random transformations (rotation, flipping and normalization) are conducted on the dataset
before training to prevent overfitting, as common practice for neural network training.
Perturbations are added to the training and test data, and clipped to ensure that the perturbed
data do not exceed the [0, 1] range. In the SGD optimization process, the data in each
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training batch are normalized before calculating the loss since this will generally speed up
training and improve neural network learning (Ioffe and Szegedy 2015). The loss function
is calculated using the superquantile formulation derived in 2.10.
Algorithm 3 Calculate the accuracy of the neural network using superquantile approach
with random noise profile X
Select U ∈ [0, 1), error budget Y ≥ 0 and attack size !.
Specify the necessary training hyperparameters for stable training
Parse the dataset and ensure all values are in the [0, 1] range.
Normalize the training and test sets, and perform random rotation (up to 5 deg) and
vertical flipping on the training dataset.
Initialize the variable W to 0
for = ∈ num of epochs do
for < ∈ num of batches do
Inject perturbations into the training dataset:
GC = G + Xb, and clip GC ∈ [0, 1]
Normalize the training set GC
Calculate the loss function as stated in (2.10).
Calculate the gradient of the loss function and perform backward propagation.
Update the model and step forward in SGD.
end for
end for
Inject perturbations to the test data:
G? = G + Yb, and clip G? ∈ [0, 1] .
Calculate the accuracy of the model 3 = 1 − ℓ(~, 0>G? + 1)
4.2 Experiment Setup
Both random noise and adversarial trained perturbations are injected into the dataset to
evaluate the robustness of the neural network. This consists of uniform noise, Gaussian
noise and a 20-step PGD adversarial attack. We use a 1-step PGD method (equivalent of
FGSM perturbation) to train for the adversarial attack since it is faster to compute than
standard 20-step PGD training and could approximate the PGD attack distribution better
than random noise. The use of FGSM for adversarial training is reported in Wong et al.
(2020) to be just as effective as standard PGD-based training and can significantly shorten
the training time. However, it is not widely adopted since past attempts can fail due to
overfitting. Overfitting is less common in superquantiles as the choice of U close to 1 will
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iteratively find the worst-case examples to fit themodel. In addition, the images in the dataset
are randomly rotated by up to 5 degrees as a standard practice to help alleviate overfitting.
A large minibatch of size 500 is used for SGD, as initial trials show that larger batch sizes
give slightly better accuracy under large U values close to 0.9 and above. The failure of
smaller minibatches matches the observation reported in Curi et al. (2020) that minibatch
estimation of the gradient in the superquantile formulation suffers from high variance as
only a fraction of the data points will be used. The paper only evaluates with a batch
size of 128, probably due to computational constraints. A larger minibatch can potentially
overcome this constraint by taking more points in the batch, thereby achieving better results.
In addition, momentum 0.9 and weight decay 5 × 10−4 are used in SGD optimization for
all training instances as commonly used in other works (Curi et al. 2020; Wong et al. 2020;
Wang et al. 2020).
We use a learning rate of 0.01 as it offers a good compromise between the convergence rate,
model accuracy, and stability. Higher U values near 0.9 and above sometimes require lower
learning rates less than 0.001 since the 1 − U term in the denominator of the loss function
amplifies the losses too high, thereby resulting in unstable training.
There are various types of neural networkmodels that could be used for image classification,
and each have reported different degrees of success for training on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Residual neural network (ResNet), at the time of writing, is the de facto standard to use and
at the top of the leaderboard for adversarial training (Croce et al. 2020). It performs well
because it can skip connections over some layers to avoid vanishing gradients and mitigate
accuracy saturation, which challenges plain neural networks with increasing layers. wide
residual network (WRN) is a variation of ResNet with reduced depth but increased width,
which is shown to perform better in Zagoruyko and Komodakis (2016). We choose to use
WideResNet-34-10, following the setup in Madry et al. (2017), since it is shown to perform
well in both image classification and adversarial training.
All computations in this chapter are performed in a compute server using 2 compute CPU
cores, a 32GB Tesla V100 GPU, and 16GB of RAM allocated. All statistical computations
and data manipulations are performed using Python, while the neural network operations
are performed using Pytorch. Each epoch takes less than 10 seconds to train on the MNIST




The MNIST dataset from Lecun et al. (1998) consists of 32x32 gray-scale images of
handwritten digits from 0 to 9, with 60,000 examples in the training set and 10,000 examples
in the test set, shown in Figure 4.1. This is the most widely used dataset in supervised
learning for handwritten digit recognition and it is relatively easy to achieve high accuracy
above 90%. Most modern computers with graphics processing unit (GPU) acceleration can
achieve this in a few minutes using only a few layers of neural networks.
Figure 4.1. Example images from MNIST showing the different handwritten
digits from 0 to 9. Source: Lecun et al. (1998).
4.3.2 MNIST Results
Wechoose a training noise perturbation budget of X = 1.0 and fix this amount of perturbation
throughout the training cycle. The choice of high training noise is generally recommended
for superquantile training, since this essentially replaces the steps otherwise required to
solve for the worst case adversarial examples in the min-max formulation (2.1).
The following MNIST tests have only 10 epochs of training because we are more concerned
about achieving robust solutions within a short training time. In addition, the results demon-
strate that the runs have already converged to acceptable solutionswith >90%accuracy under
no perturbation.
Figure 4.2 shows that under uniform noise, the accuracy of the model improves as expected
as U → 1. Accuracy further improves as the attack size " increases, but only slightly.
Overall, the model already appears very robust to uniform noise.
32










































Figure 4.2. Model accuracy results on MNIST dataset with training noise
* (−1, 1) and different attack size (a) " = 1, (b) " = 20 with the test
dataset subject to uniform noise perturbations Y* (−1, 1).
Changing to Gaussian noise does not produce the same trend as U→ 1, as shown in Figure
4.3. Instead, the accuracy is generally higher when the U = 0.5 is chosen compared to
U = 0.9. This still holds even when the attack size " is increased from 1 to 20. Compared
to uniform noise perturbation results, the accuracy of the model with Gaussian noise
perturbation degrades more, with accuracy below 80% when subjected to test perturbations
Y = 1. This shows that the use of superquantiles can be sensitive to the type of noise
distribution. Moreover, the robustness improvement brought by higher U is also not apparent
in this case.
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Figure 4.3. Model accuracy results on MNIST dataset with training noise
# (0, 1) and different attack size (a) " = 1, (b) " = 20 with the test
dataset subject to Gaussian noise perturbations Y# (0, 1).
After switching to PGD adversarial attack, we notice that it is clearly stronger than random
noise attacks as model accuracy reduces to around 50% when the error budget Y = 0.3,
as shown in Figure 4.4. This is expected as PGD attack is commonly regarded as one of
the strongest forms of attack. We also note that model accuracy increases as U → 1, and
generally improves when the attack size is increased to 20. The exception is U = 0.9 in
this case as the larger attack size results in a lower model robustness when Y > 0.1. This
discrepancy could be due to a number of reasons, including peculiarities in the nonlinear
solution space, ineffective 1-step PGDused in the training phase or just random initialization
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problems. Nonetheless, the benefit of increased attack size seems insignificant compared to
its increase in computation demand.




































Figure 4.4. Model accuracy results on MNIST dataset with 1-step PGD
training and different attack size (a) " = 1, (b) " = 20 with the test
dataset subject to Y amount of PGD perturbations.
Overall, the MNIST dataset seems to show little benefit with the use of higher superquantile
values, in contrast to earlier SVM results. This could be due to the nature of the dataset
since the images of digits are fairly simplistic. This also explains how easy it is to achieve
high accuracy within a few epochs and maintain its robustness against random noise. Since
superquantiles work by finding theworst case examples within the data distribution, a benign




The CIFAR-10 dataset in Krizhevsky and Hinton (2009) consists of 32x32 color images
in 10 classes shown in Figure 4.5. It is divided randomly into a training set with 50,000
images (5,000 images per class) and a test set with 10,000 images (1,000 images per class).
Typical supervised learning conducted using CNN can achieve accuracy about 80%, but
computation time for each test case will take hours, or even days for adversarial training.
Therefore, this is left as the final benchmark comparison due to study time constraints.
Figure 4.5. Example images from CIFAR-10 showing the different classes
of images corresponding to physical objects. Source: Krizhevsky and Hinton
(2009).
4.4.2 CIFAR-10 Results
We choose a training budget of X = 0.1 as the scale of perturbations to add to the train-
ing dataset. This is chosen after some initial trials that show higher training perturbation
leading to poor or no training under certain scenarios. Instead of complicating the setup by
introducing more regularization terms and optimization changes, we decide to reduce the
budget to a sufficiently low value, while maintaining the robustness performance.
For benchmarking with typical adversarial training, each experiment runs for 200 epochs to
allow sufficient iterations to reach convergence, instead of stopping at shorter epochs. The
adversarial training method uses a similar algorithm to train, with the only key difference
that it uses a standard cross entropy loss function instead of the superquantile. A learning
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rate scheduler is used to reduce the learning rate by a factor of 10 at every 50 and 100
epochs to improve the training stability and keep the solution from diverging away from
the optimal point. This schedule references the same scheme used in Wang et al. (2020) for
adversarial training, which manages to achieve good accuracy under adversarial attack.
The random noise perturbation results, shown in Figure 4.6, demonstrate that the models are
fairly robust within the error budget range. Interestingly, as U increases, the model accuracy
increases as well, thereby showing better results when U = 0.9. This aligns with our initial
observation with SVM where superquantile training exhibits a similar effect to improving
both accuracy and robustness.
Our results with PGD attack show a much larger differentiation, as shown in Figure 4.7.
This supports the initial observation that PGD is a stronger attack than random noise, to the
extent that U = 0 experiences misclassification of all the data at Y = 0.3. This observation
concurs with Szegedy et al. (2014) that first uncovers the vulnerability of neural networks
to adversarial attacks. Increasing U to 0.9 leads to more robust results with performance
levels matching more closely to typical adversarial training. This clearly demonstrates the
ability of superquantile training to improve model robustness against adversarial attack.
Moreover, each epoch in the superquantile training only takes an average of about 2 minutes
and 30 seconds, while typical adversarial training will take an average of 3 minutes and
45 seconds. Therefore, superquantile training can potentially offer about 35% faster results
with comparable robustness performance, especially in the lower Y error range.
However, superquantile training can not perform as well as adversarial training because
the two methods use different adversarial examples with the superquantile training only
using a weaker approximate 1-step PGD. A better approximation will require a multi-step
PGD, which will trade off with more computational time. Nonetheless, the utility of an
approximate method is clear from the area between U = 0 and U = 0.9 in Figure 4.7, which
denotes the accuracy improvement bought about by superquantile training.
37








































Figure 4.6. Model accuracy results on CIFAR-10 dataset subject to (a) ran-
dom noise, and (b) Gaussian noise perturbations on the test data.
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Figure 4.7. Comparing model performance between superquantile training
with different U and a typical adversarial training.
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We present in this paper a novel application of superquantile optimization in adversarial
training, to alleviate the computation time required to solve for the worst case adversarial
perturbations. Our proposed method works by finding the approximate worst case losses
by focusing on the higher tail-end losses in the perturbed training distribution, and the
initial results show some promise that this method works for neural network training using
commonly used Stochastic Gradient Descent optimization.
Our work here provides an initial excursion into superquantile training in support vector
machines and neural networks. In the context of support vector machines, superquantile
training gives similar results to !1-regularization with the appropriate amount of training
perturbation and choice of suitable superquantile parameter U close to 1. Increasing the
attack size to 10 allows superquantile training to achieve about 2% to 5% better accuracy
than !1-regularization under uniform noise, and about 2% to 10% improvement under
Gaussian noise, while within a test error budget between 0.1 to 0.5. However, the 10 times
increase in attack size leads to about 13 times more computation time, which does not
seem to be a favorable trade-off. Increasing the amount of training perturbation is able to
produce up to 10% higher robustness than !1-regularization for most values of U except
for U = 0.99, which experiences a reduction in training accuracy in the lower error budget
range of 0 to 0.4. This shows that we have to experiment with different U and training noise
to achieve optimal robust results.
In the context of neural networks, superquantile training is robust to random noise distribu-
tion and projected gradient descent adversarial attacks to varying degrees. For the MNIST
dataset, there is less than 5% difference between different choice of U and attack sizes, and
in the instance of Gaussian noise perturbations, U = 0.5 produces higher accuracy than
U = 0.9, even though both are very close. Switching to an adversarial attack results in faster
degradation in model accuracy with increasing test perturbations, but U = 0.9 produces
12% better accuracy at higher error budget n = 0.3, thereby demonstrating the value of
superquantile training for adversarial training.
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For the CIFAR-10 dataset, superquantile training is robust to random noise in the 0 to 0.1
error budget range with accuracies close to 90%. This greatly degrades when subject to
adversarial attack, where the accuracy at U = 0 falls to near 0% at a test error budget of
0.03. Increasing to U = 0.9 improves the robustness results and reduces the performance
difference with typical adversarial training to 10%, while taking 35% less training time
to achieve it. This is possible only with a careful choice of a large batch size of 500 and
a suitably low learning rate of 0.01 or less. In general, the model increases in accuracy
and robustness when the superquantile parameter U is close to 1, even under strong PGD
adversarial attack.
Although these initial results show some promise, more work is required to certify that the
method will offer certain robustness guarantees. This includes more experimentation on
different datasets and expanding our theoretical understanding of superquantile training in
neural network training.
5.1 Challenges and Limitations
There is generally a limited theoretical understanding of adversarial training throughout
the machine learning field. This is because neural networks are typically nonlinear and
nonconvex, so solving for the weights through optimization is typically NP-hard. As such, it
is generally difficult to prove with confidence that a method working for one dataset and one
type of perturbation will be applicable for all. We can use empirical methods to uncover the
limits of the proposed method, but this is difficult to generalize across all possible datasets.
In addition, there is no generally acceptable method of tuning the hyperparameters for
different models and datasets. This is still a field of active study and more work is required
to adopt adaptive algorithms in the superquantile context. We have uncovered that a larger
batch size can produce better performance, but multiple trials have to be conducted to find
the right set of hyperparameters such as learning rate and training noise amount. This trial
process will extend the time required to build and run the model, thereby affecting the
performance gains afforded by using the algorithm.
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5.2 Recommendations for Future Work
Although we have shown that the superquantile can give comparable results compared
to adversarial training, there is still room to enhance this further and possibly exceed
the performance of typical adversarial methods. One of the important factors yet to be
explored include schedulers for U parameter, learning rate and training noise. One could
set adaptive schedules for U, noise and learning rate to accelerate the convergence to worst
case perturbations or introduce excursions out of local optimal points to find more global
optimal points.
In addition,we could explore solving for the auxiliary term W in the superquantile formulation
independently within each SGD epoch, instead of the current implementation, where it is
optimized using SGD together with the weights in the neural network model. This means
that the choice of quantile within each epoch can be varied independently and potentially
help to improve the convergence and stability of the SGD optimization. However, this comes
at a trade-off of higher computational cost per epoch, which could outweigh the speedup
afforded by using superquantiles.
Adversarial training is a fast evolving area of study, new algorithms and techniques are
constantly being developed and published regularly. Some of these techniques can also
shorten the adversarial training process, and some can potentially be compatible with our
proposed superquantile training to deliver even better results. Most notably, methods that
can improve the approximation of the worst case perturbations will greatly help to improve
the superquantile model accuracy and robustness.
Adversarial attacks can take various forms, and there are still many variants left unexplored
in this thesis. One could experiment with the use of black-out pixels to partially obscure
an object image. This has various military applications such as the use of camouflage to
avoid detection, and conversely, the application of robust training to build image detection
algorithms that can detect "hidden" targets.
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